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James Callaghan had a resolutely working-class background, and during it he experienced 
genuine poverty and hardship. The early death of his father as the main breadwinner left his 
family reliant on charity at a time (the 1920s) when the UK welfare state was far more limited 
and conditional than the post-1945 more universalised model. Pension improvements for 
widows under the first Labour government (1924) eased the family’s burden somewhat, and 
this personalised, first-hand benefit of a welfare policy reform would play a significant role in 
the young Callaghan’s initial politicisation. This challenging family upbringing could therefore 
certainly be said to have shaped his formative commitments to the egalitarian focus of the  
Labour Party, while also reflecting the very positive impact of government social policy on 
everyday lives. It subsequently strengthened Callaghan’s political commitment to a more 
comprehensive and paternalistic welfare model that aspired to keep the poorest members of 
society out of the clutches of desperate poverty. As his political career took shape, this made 
Callaghan naturally sympathetic to those social groups who relied on the welfare state to 
main the basic standards of everyday living, and this attitude was further consolidated by him 
representing a working-class area of Cardiff in Parliament from 1945 onwards, right up until 
his retirement as an MP in 1987. Such experiences certainly influenced his burgeoning 
political outlook in the immediate post-war years, and after serving as a junior minister in the 
trailblazing 1945-51 Attlee government that established the modern welfare state, he got a 
major opportunity to put his values and beliefs into practice during the 1960s as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (1964-7). In this more senior ministerial role, he had major responsibility for 
delivering Labour’s manifesto commitments to increase old age pensions and abolish some 
charges for medicines, actively contributing to the ongoing expansion and evolution of the 
British welfare state in the process.   
 
Social policy aims and aspirations 
 
Yet it would be as Prime Minister between 1976-79 that Callaghan arguably had the greatest 
opportunity to craft a social policy direction that would potentially establish a personalised 
legacy for the class of people he originated from. As outlined in his autobiography, Callaghan 
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was driven throughout his political career by admirable social principles for high public office 
that stemmed from his upbringing, as he summarised: 
 
Central to the purpose of a Labour Government is responsibility for eliminating social 
wrongs and promoting social well-being. The class system had grown less rigid during 
my lifetime but it was still a millstone that hampered progress, as was gross 
inequality’1.  
 
The tone of these above comments reflected a sense of Callaghan’s deep commitment to 
addressing social injustices that stemmed from the class system, yet which was also aligned 
with a pragmatic awareness of the unerring resilience of various long-term socio-economic 
issues that were difficult to eradicate from British society. Such comments also highlighted 
the difficulties facing Labour governments in particular when it came to resolving deep-rooted 
poverty and social inequality, which was a long-standing cause and priority associated with 
that particular party. In terms of outlining broader social policy goals, in May 1976 Callaghan 
mapped out his longer-term objectives for the forthcoming decade (yet which he never came 
to fully deliver), and he wrote down that his aims for 1980 were to ‘resume our social aims in 
housing, education, health and welfare to build a cohesive society’2. This clearly indicated his 
desire to strengthen the effectiveness of the welfare state and broader social policy, in 
alignment with the principles of the universalised model of 1945. Yet to what degree he was 
likely to fulfil such positive aims in the late 1970s remains a matter of significant conjecture, 
and they arguably faded away and were drowned out by the somewhat chaotic and crisis-
ridden ending of his premiership in the spring of 1979.  
 
The context for delivering welfare provision and social equality 
 
Consequently, as Prime Minister in the very testing economic conditions of the mid-1970s, 
Callaghan’s strong personal commitment to maintaining the required levels of welfare 
support in the name of delivering a fairer and more equal society became a much more 
difficult square to circle. The welfare state was the key engine to lever these social goals, but 
on a longer term scale, demographic changes had placed considerable and growing pressures 
on the country’s welfare provision, evident in the fact that between 1945-75 ‘the proportion 
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of GDP spent on the main welfare services rose from just 5 per cent to around 20 per cent’3 
(incorporating all core elements of the welfare state). In addition to this, approximately one-
sixth of the population had moved above the pensionable age due to a rise in life expectancy 
(fuelled by improved welfare provision), and NHS spending had risen from an estimated £500 
million in 1951, up to £5596 million by 19754 (a tenfold increase). In short, Beveridge and the 
architects of the post-1945 welfare state had perhaps not factored in such demographic 
trends and improved levels of public health, which entailed that the financial costs of 
maintaining the post-war welfare settlement had risen significantly over three decades up 
until the point that Callaghan’s premiership commenced. Within the context of such longer 
term trends and an increasingly sluggish economy, Callaghan came to 10 Downing Street in 
the spring of 1976 amidst an atmosphere of significant economic strains impacting on the 
government’s capacity to deliver core public services, and which culminated in his 
administration taking a loan from the IMF later that year. Some have described this bleak 
scenario as representing a prevailing environment of ‘stagflation’- specifically a combination 
of a stagnant economy, rising unemployment and surging inflation5.  
 
This turbulent atmosphere placed tremendous pressure on the maintenance and 
delivery of the post-war model of welfare provision that Callaghan believed was vital for the 
well-being of the poorer social classes from where he originated.  The most urgent challenge 
was arguably to reduce the scourge of inflation, which impacted on the costs of everyday 
goods for ordinary people, but also crucially on the costs of delivering the welfare services 
that the government provided, namely in terms of purchasing materials and paying wages. 
Yet this drive to reduce public expenditure costs and to instil greater economic stability 
entailed tough implications for social policy, potentially further worsening the everyday living 
conditions of the poorer classes, and therefore making Callaghan’s aspirations for a more 
equal and socially just society far more difficult to fulfil.  Within this context, and in the shorter 
term at least, the first obvious signs of trouble in meeting such social policy aspirations were 
the demands imposed by the IMF loan, which would cast a major economic cloud over most 
of 19766, and which was undoubtedly one of the most serious crises of post-war British 
politics.  On this basis, one of Callaghan’s first notable instructions to his Cabinet, via the 
calculations of his often-besieged Chancellor Denis Healey, was to tackle such spiralling public 
spending levels by asking ministers to identify approximately £1.5 billion of total spending 
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cuts in order to meet the initial IMF loan requirements of $3.9 billion dollars7. Callaghan 
himself observed that his minsters ‘were obviously concerned to protect their cherished 
programmes’8, including Secretary of State for Health and Social Services David Ennals.  
Indeed, in such key departments, at the heart of the government’s social policy agenda, such 
cutbacks would have an inevitably negative impact on both welfare recipients and the public 
sector workforce, despite attempts to curb bureaucratic costs rather than frontline welfare 
provision.  Difficulties in dealing with the workforce saw ministers like Ennals facing an 
ongoing battle over pay with disgruntled NHS workers in particular during the 1976-79 period. 
Yet the need to address the spiralling levels of public spending remained the political priority 
for Callaghan’s administration, and the narrative of economic retrenchment and wage 
restraint to ‘balance the books’ was particularly epitomised by his often-quoted 1976 annual 
Labour Party Conference speech where he declared that ‘We used to think you could spend 
your way out of recession’, before warning delegates that such an option no longer existed 
due to the country’s weakened economic state.  
 
This speech appeared to mark an initial admittance by senior Labour figures that the 
country had reached the end of the so-called ‘years of consensus’, and Callaghan went on to 
declare in this speech that if such an expansive ‘Keynesian’ option was pursued as some of 
the Labour left wanted, those who suffered most would be ‘the poor, the old and the sick’9 
due to the further public raft of expenditure cuts that he claimed would have to follow. Yet 
in delivering his speech, Callaghan appeared to be making a symbolic retreat from the 
interventionist commitment towards full employment and a more egalitarian society, and in 
doing so left-wing critics could claim he was departing from the fundamental principles of the 
1945 Beveridge welfare settlement. While Callaghan was conscious of some relative short-
term pain for the heavily unionised public sector workers in terms of pay reductions caused 
by this economic squeeze, on an electoral level this also ran the risk of alienating some of 
Labour’s key voting groups in the build-up to the next general election, due in 1979.  Indeed, 
what had notably hampered Callaghan’s government in this specific policy area was the fact 
that due to the escalation of the welfare state in both size and cost over the course of the 
post-war era, it had ‘generated massive new lobbies of political interest (of both consumers 
and producers) …. (who) had an active interest in seeing the size and resources of the public 
sector expand’10. This meant that both the producers (workforce) and the users and recipients 
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of the welfare state had a vested interest in seeing it continue to expand, thus benefitting 
them in terms of both employment and social rights respectively. A specific criticism to 
consequently emerge from the political right was that the producers (notably the unions) had 
too much power and control, at the ultimate expense of the users. Such a  scenario put the 
Callaghan administration in a particularly difficult position when it came to making cutbacks 
in the social policy sphere, creating the potential for it to antagonise some significant bodies 
of public opinion (namely welfare recipients and those working in the welfare system), who 
both formed key components of the Labour electoral coalition. Yet Callaghan nevertheless 
firmly believed that it was only by taking such harsh but responsible economic decisions that 
in the longer term his government could maintain ‘the living standards of the sick, the poorest, 
the unemployed and the pensioners’11, which again reflected both the social welfare policy 
priorities and practical political calculations at the heart of his political agenda. This suggests 
that amidst the tough economic decision-making taking by his administration during its first 
year in office in particular, it was society’s most vulnerable who (for varying reasons) 
appeared to be at the forefront of Prime Minister Callaghan’s thoughts. 
 
Analysis of Callaghan’s social policies- tackling poverty and inequality 
 
Consequently, as economic conditions gradually improved during 1977-78, Callaghan could 
claim that his government’s capacity to invest in core areas of social and welfare policy 
improved likewise. Yet while particularly conscious of cultivating the support and loyalty of 
welfare users, Callaghan’s administration increasingly appeared to lose patience with another 
core group of traditional Labour supporters (the trade unions), and history tells us that in 
resisting the more extreme wage demands of the welfare state’s workforce he ultimately 
sealed his own political fate. Yet despite Callaghan’s sense of justification for his course of 
action in this specific policy area, academic policy experts from the left continued to criticise 
what they perceived to be the ongoing failure of 1945 Beveridge settlement in tackling 
persistently stubborn levels of poverty and inequality, and highlight how Labour governments 
(such as this one) particularly  struggled to address what was one of their core policy priorities. 
Brian Abel-Smith was one such prominent figure from this tradition, and his background in 
social policy had been developed in research work with Professor Richard Titmuss of the 
London School of Economics, and then in a further research capacity on the Guillebaud 
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Enquiry (1956), which explored the ongoing cost of the National Health Service. Following on 
from his 1950s conclusions that the NHS established from 1948 was indeed an affordable 
public service model, Abel-Smith would argue that governments should be doing more in the 
welfare policy sphere, particularly those that were Labour-led with more interventionist and 
welfarist political instincts. In partnership with sociologist Peter Townsend, Abel-Smith was 
also responsible for establishing a new so-called ‘poverty line’, which appeared to prove that 
despite the extension of a more comprehensive welfare state after 1945, poverty had actually 
increased in Britain from the 1950s onwards, specifically for the most vulnerable groups 
unaffected by the ‘era of prosperity’. This ‘poverty line’ would form the basis for the 
somewhat controversial and damaging argument that even under Labour governments after 
1945, poverty had risen. Within such a context, there were various key welfare policy areas 
that provided Callaghan’s government with the potential to notably benefit poorer citizens 




Abel-Smith and Townsend were therefore advocates of a more effective and expanding 
welfare state, and they authored the 1965 book The Poor and the Poorest, which in its focus 
on the impact of poverty on children in particular, inspired the formation of the Child Poverty 
Action Group (CPAG) in 1965. The director of this organisation between 1969-79 was Frank 
Field, who went on to become a Labour MP for 40 years, and was briefly Minister for Welfare 
Reform during Tony Blair’s first administration in the late 1990s. During the Callaghan era, 
Field emerged on the political left as a critic of this administration’s social policies, and in this 
specific role he gained much of his welfare policy expertise, while formulating various 
criticisms of government fallings in this policy sphere in the process12. Abel-Smith went on to 
become a special (expert) adviser to Secretary of State Ennals between 1976-78, and in 1977 
he was influential in instigating ‘The Black Report’ (reporting back in 1980), and which 
formally concluded that the post-war welfare state had so far failed to tackle long-standing 
socio-economic inequality. All such developments reflected ongoing concerns on the political 
and academic left with how the post-war welfare model was performing for those that 
needed it most, both during Callaghan’s government, as well as under the Wilson Labour 
administrations that preceded it during the 1960s and earlier 1970s. Nevertheless, some 
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positive social policy innovation did take place during the period 1976-79, but its 
implementation proved to be problematic and the government gained limited credit for it. As 
an example, under significant pressure from charities such as the CPAG in particular, 
Callaghan inherited responsibility for implementing the 1975 Child Benefit Bill. The involved 
the merging of existing state allowances, replacing family allowance with a benefit for each 
child, (which was more generous in terms of working to the advantage of larger families in 
particular). This innovation marked a further widening of the scope of the original 1946 Family 
Allowances Act, which had always been paid directly to the mother, while being universal in 
its application and not means-tested. Yet by the time Callaghan took office, this generous 
manifesto pledge had encountered some resistance in terms of cost, as well as concerns 
about removing an existing child tax allowance for men to fund an inflated level of child 
benefit paid directly to women. Some feared this would be electorally unpopular, including 
Chancellor Healey who observed its potential to ‘cost us male votes because it would mean a 
switch from the wallet to the handbag’ 13. Frank Field exposed these various objections with 
support from sympathetic (anonymous) leaks from a civil servant named Malcolm Wicks, who 
would also later become a Labour MP. Field (who maintained the identity of his anonymous 
source until after Wicks’ death) recalls: 
 
‘Child benefit was a commitment in the two 1974 manifestos….. I was incensed at the 
whips alleging that backbenchers were against the scheme….. (and) this purported 
survey was used to convince trade union leaders that, without backbench support, they 
should withdraw their support for a reform that had been prominent in two party 
manifestos. Once the anonymous article I wrote was published in New Society, under 
the headline “Killing a Commitment”….. (it led to) the embarrassment of the prime 
minister and chancellor misleading their colleagues in cabinet, in the unions and on 
the backbenches’14.  
 
Economic conditions certainly created some political resistance and this ultimately played a 
part in the way this social policy was introduced. The government’s image was consequently 
damaged in terms of its apparent commitment to progressive welfare reform, yet while this 
particular policy’s roll-out was delayed, it was eventually phased in between 1977-7915, 
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representing a notable welfare expansion and contributing to the ‘biggest increase in real 
family income for a long time’16.   
 
Social Housing Policy 
 
In the housing domain, providing and constructing significant levels of state-subsidised 
council houses had been a staple of Labour governments since the 1920s in terms of 
addressing social hardship, poverty and providing minimum standards of housing. Callaghan’s 
government was able to maintain its provision of this social policy to a degree amidst difficult 
economic conditions, but its rate of construction did steadily fall throughout the 
administration (see table one), which can be viewed as a criticism in terms of meeting the 
social needs in this area. As an example, the approximate 85,000 council properties built in 
1979 compared poorly to almost 200,000 a year during the mid-1960s. Yet the government 
would defend its record in social housing policy by highlighting expenditure cutbacks required 
after 1976, but concerns about volume of social housing built were also fuelled by concerns 
about quality (which spanned previous Conservative governments also).  This was related to 
the fact that during this period, various issues and problems were being highlighted about the 
quality and durability of many of the high-rise ‘futuristic’ council housing blocks that were 
being built (so-called ‘streets in the sky’). Influenced by European trends in architecture, many 
such high-rise structures appear to have been built cheaply, and would quickly prove to be 
unpopular with tenants and have limited lifespans in most cases. As a further complication 
for this policy area, there had also been a steady growth in the number of council tenants 
buying their properties from the early 1970s, as had been encouraged by the Heath 
Conservative government of 1970-74. Callaghan’s Environment Minister (with responsibility 
for housing) Peter Shore acknowledged that Labour should react to such a trend which 
reflected some degree of popular demand, and in 1977 he issued a government green paper 
that acknowledged that home ownership was a "strong and natural desire" for many citizens, 
and that such aspirations "should be met" by the government17. 
 




Year England & Wales Scotland Total 
1974 99.4 16.2 115.6 
1975 122.9 22.8 145.7 
1976 124.2 21.2 145.4 
1977 121.2 14.3 131.1 
1978 96.8 9.9 106.7 
1979 75.0 7.9 84.9 
 
Source:  
John English (ed.)., The Future of Council Housing, (1982) and 




However, perhaps reflecting the more collectivist instincts of the left, Shore explored 
the prospect of shared equity/ownership schemes, encouraged the development of housing 
associations and also housing provision via charities or other (non-state) social bodies, hoping 
such measures would provide the catalyst for much-needed inner-city regeneration. Yet 
Labour’s social housing policy at this stage ultimately remained aligned with the conventional 
Beveridge model that the bulk of council housing would be primarily maintained by the state 
via local authorities, and there remained approximately 6.5 million council-owned houses 
when Labour left office in 1979, representing an estimated third of all housing occupancies in 
the country. However in tough economic conditions, the ongoing cost of providing such 
housing stock to the required standards remained a problem that needed addressing.  
Consequently, this post-war social housing equilibrium would be transformed by Thatcher’s 
populist ‘right to buy’ policy, which began to significantly deplete local authority housing stock 
from 1980 onwards. It could be argued that in adopting this policy, Thatcher radically tackled 
the longer term affordability issue of how the government could deliver such a volume of 
social housing within the welfare state, yet in a much bolder and often destabilising way (for 




NHS funding and expenditure 
 
The creation of the NHS has been viewed as perhaps the most enduring and monumental 
legacy of the Attlee administration of 1945-51, and subsequent Labour governments in 
particular viewed this core public institution with a degree of both reverence and awe. Its 
socially egalitarian implications have therefore been a key challenge for successive 
governments to maintain, particularly those of the political left. The Department of Health 
and Social Security was at this time a fused ministerial portfolio at the hub of social policy-
making, so on this basis the NHS also came under the remit of David Ennals. As already alluded 
to, healthcare workers were a key part of the public sector workforce, and during this decade 
were involved in ongoing pay disputes with the government amidst a turbulent period of 
industrial relations. However, in the Callaghan government’s defence, spending levels on the 
NHS were reasonably maintained by the historical standards of the decade. Although 
measured by a percentage of GDP the rate did fall slightly compared to the Wilson Labour 
administration (1974-76), it was favourable compared to the Conservative government of 
Heath between 1970-74. Nevertheless, the annual rate of NHS spending growth during the 
Callaghan government did significantly drop after 1975-76 (see table two).  
 
Table Two: Annual changes in NHS spending 
 








The King’s Fund, John Appleby,  






Yet this trend again has to be seen within the context of the more stringent economic 
conditions imposed in the wake of the IMF loan, which evidently impacted on the 
government’s public spending commitments. While this can be seen as a negative in terms of 
the funding levels required in terms of meeting the inexorable and unlimited service demands 
of the NHS, the rate of the spending fall as a percentage of GDP was relatively slight (see table 
three), and service levels could therefore be seen to have been maintained to sufficient 
standards to benefit the poorer social groups who used and needed it most. However, both 
the trade unions and wider public demand always wanted more, while a steadily rising and 
ageing population placed ongoing strains on the service.  
 





NHS spending as a % of GDP 
1970 55.6 3.6 
1971 55.9 3.7 
1972 56.0 3.6 
1973 56.2 3.7 
1974 56.2 4.2 
1975 56.2 4.5 
1976 56.2 4.4 
1977 56.1 4.2 
1978 56.1 4.1 
1979 56.2 4.0 
 
Adapted from sources: 
John Appleby, Nuffield Trust, 70 years of NHS spending, (21st March 2018) 
 https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/news-item/70-years-of-nhs-spending  






Conclusion- success or failure? 
 
Callaghan undoubtedly inherited something of a political ‘poisoned chalice’ from 1976 
onwards, with a whole range of challenging socio-economic policy problems piled up on his 
in-tray from the moment he became Prime Minister. He would later claim that despite the 
economic and industrial turmoil that dominated his premiership, the continuous Labour 
government of 1974-79 had in fact managed some notable social policy successes amidst very 
difficult circumstances: ‘We had protected the weakest in the country during our period of 
office, and in some areas had increased benefits, notably those of children,’18. In re-
emphasizing his pragmatic political streak, Callaghan would refer to this political approach as 
‘practical Socialism….  ensuring the nation met the needs of those who were unable to help 
themselves’19.  He could also point out that the Labour vote in 1979 had actually numerically 
risen since the October 1974 general election, although as a national percentage it had 
dropped, and the Conservative opposition vote had of course improved even more. Callaghan 
himself argued that despite his electoral defeat, the consolidation of reasonably solid Labour 
electoral support suggested some degree of success on various policy fronts since 1976, most 
notably in relation to the ongoing delivery and protection of key public services and social 
policy, which reflected ‘how much steady understanding and support existed for what we tried 
to do’20.  Indeed, the post-war era up until 1979 saw Britain becoming a more equal society, 
and the 1970s as a decade is now viewed as arguably the most egalitarian of the entire 20th 
century, and Callaghan could rightly claim that his government played a part in maintaining 
this status21. Subsequently, in the years that followed this administration the gap between 
rich and poor in the UK has consistently widened, creating more inequality in the process (see 
figure one below). As the IFS has commented, the ‘general pattern is of increases in social 
equality during the 1970s, followed by rising inequality in the 1980s and 1990s’22, so on this 
basis perhaps the Callaghan administration deserves some credit when it comes to the 
question of how it managed social inequality and wealth variations within British society. This 













It is also true that by the late 1970s an improving economy and falling inflation rate 
had allowed core public services to be secured and maintained in the longer run, but on a 
political level increasing numbers of voters were clearly unsatisfied by the ongoing sense of 
crisis and the inexorable growth and ongoing cost of the welfare state. Indeed, the overall 
welfare (social security) budget had steadily risen throughout the 1970s, from approximately 
just over 7% of GDP in the early 1970s, to 9% by the early 1980s23. While some of this increase 
could be linked to the IMF loan and a subsequent rise in unemployment benefit, the ongoing 
costs of social security had been on a steadily upward spiral since 1945 due to longer term 
factors such as population growth, increased eligibility and more generous payments. Notable 
free-market bodies such as the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) had been arguing since the 
1950s that expanding welfare costs were ultimately unsustainable in the longer term and 
would prove to be a drain on the country’s economic performance, and it was during the 
1970s that such warnings seemed to be coming to fruition. On this premise, the flourishing 
New Right agenda and some of its key figureheads such as Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret 
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Thatcher, (inspired by the writings of Hayek), offered a libertarian critique of British welfare 
prevision, and saw the opportunity for a radical and ideology-driven restructuring and 
eventual ‘shrinking’ of what they viewed as a bloated and inefficient welfare state if the 
Conservatives could win the 1979 General Election. This focus on expenditure retrenchment 
was a key element in how they eventually secured this electoral victory that ended 
Callaghan’s premiership, and it reflected the Conservatives’ ability ‘to tap into a growing (if 
inarticulate) strain of popular disenchantment….. about the state of the welfare state’24 and 
specifically its ongoing cost and affordability. This more economically prudent and neoliberal 
analysis chimed in with the country’s mood after the IMF crisis, aligned with fears about 
‘dependency’ and people getting ‘something for nothing’ that was prevalent among 
financially stretched skilled workers in particular.  This socio-economic group would go on to 
form a vital component of the Thatcher electoral coalition in the years ahead.  
 
Other recurring criticisms continued from the left, featuring claims that that while the 
Callaghan government staved off the most destructive potential cuts affecting social policy, 
in practical terms this entailed that by engaging in such ‘firefighting’ it lost any coherent focus 
on tackling inequality and redistributing wealth.  Some left-wing critics could also validly 
question whether Callaghan’s paternalistic tendencies were wholly compatible with greater 
egalitarianism and redistribution. Anti-poverty campaigners and charities like the CPAG, 
advised by academics such as Brian Abel-Smith, continued to lament that unacceptable rates 
of poverty still existed in one of the world’s strongest economies and richest nations, and by 
implication this was a condemnation of Labour’s consistent failings in this policy sphere25. As 
a specific negative observation, one commentator has remarked that during this embattled 
administration of 1976-79 the ‘poor saw little improvement in their lot. Child Benefit, 
introduced in 1976, appeared to be a big spending increase, but in reality it largely replaced 
child tax allowances. Then the economy just went off the rails’26. David Piachaud, an academic 
and another advisor to this government claims that 'Previous Labour governments failed to 
make any real impact on poverty because they were knocked off course by the macro-
economy…..(and that) under Callaghan, any redistribution ground to a halt because the IMF 
stepped in’27. Piacahud also had links with Abel-Smith, and both had been a source of 
expertise and knowledge to successive Labour governments during the 1960s and 70s in the 




In addition, the sense of prolonged economic crisis had in turn created a stagnant 
welfare state environment which became complacent and lacked dynamism, and which has 
been described as existing in ‘a routinised pattern of incremental growth and institutional 
torpor’28.  The nature of these varying criticisms highlight the dilemma faced by the Callaghan 
government when it came to social policy delivery- specifically that the political left argued it 
was not spending sufficient money on tackling poverty and inequality, whereas the right 
claimed it was spending too much and in an inefficient and bureaucratic manner. This had 
been a long-standing and recurring pattern of simmering debate since the establishment of 
the post-1945 Beveridge welfare legacy, and in the context of a crippling economic crisis it 
appeared to peak during Callaghan’s three year tenure as Prime Minister, before further 
evolving in a markedly different direction under a Thatcherite policy agenda during the 1980s. 
Given the various globalised political and economic trends of the 1970s, it is perhaps doubtful 
whether any government of the left, conspicuously tiring after five continuous and difficult 
years in office since 1974, could have stopped the advent of New Right ideology and its more 
radical alternative solutions for both the British economy and associated welfare delivery. 
This could perhaps cushion some of the criticisms and negativity that have been directed at 
Callaghan’s social policy record, as his government did manage to avoid the more volatile 
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